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Abstract
A pre-test of Ramsey optimal policy versus time-consistent policy rejects time-
consistent policy and (optimal) simple rule for the U.S. Fed during 1960 to 2006,
assuming the reference new-Keynesian Phillips curve transmission mechanism with
auto-correlated cost-push shock. The number of reduced form parameters is larger
with Ramsey optimal policy than with time-consistent policy although the number
of structural parameters, including central bank preferences, is the same. The new-
Keynesian Phillips curve model is under-identied with Ramsey optimal policy (one
identifying equation missing) and hence under-identied for time-consistent policy
(three identifying equations missing). Estimating a structural VAR for Ramsey
optimal policy during Volcker-Greenspan period, the new-Keynesian Phillips curve
slope parameter and the Feds preferences (weight of the volatility of the output
gap) are not statistically di¤erent from zero at the 5% level.
JEL classication numbers: C61, C62, E43, E44, E47, E52, E58.
Keywords: Ramsey optimal policy, Time-consistent policy, Identication,
Central bank preferences, New-Keynesian Phillips curve.
1 Introduction
Can we pre-test if the Fed follows Ramsey optimal policy or a time-consistent policy
(Cohen and Michel (1988))? Are central bank preferences facing the same identication
problem as simple Taylor rule parameters? Cochrane (2011) found that the simple Taylor
rule parameter describing the response of the interest rate to ination is not identied
in new-Keynesian models including forward-looking ination and a non-observable auto-
regressive shock. Finally, can we jointly test on US data the new-Keynesian Phillips
curve monetary policy transmission mechanism and a representation of the rule of the
policy with passed the pre-test?
There are several estimations of Feds preferences assuming ination is a predeter-
mined variable or a forward-looking variable, assuming Ramsey optimal policy or time-
consistent policy, assuming Phillips curve or new-Keynesian Phillips curve as a mone-
tary policy transmission mechanism: e.g. Cechetti and Ehrmann (2002), Ozlale (2003),
We thank Robert Kollman, our discussant in Rennes macroeconomic workshop, and Georges Overton
for very helpful insights.
yParis School of Economics, Université Paris 1 Pantheon Sorbonne, PjSE, 48 Boulevard Jourdan,
75014 Paris. Email: jean-bernard.chatelain@univ-paris1.fr
zESCE International Business School, 10 rue Sextius Michel, 75015 Paris, Email: Kirsten.Ralf@esce.fr.
1
Castelnuovo and Surico (2004), Castelnuovo (2006), Juillard et al. (2006), Adjemian and
Devulder (2011), Levieuge and Lucotte (2014), Paez-Farrell (2015)...
Söderlinds (1999) is a commonly used maximum likelihood estimation of the Hamil-
tonian system of Ramsey optimal policy and of time-consistent policy. The functional
form of the Hamiltonian system which is estimated does not take into account the
transversality conditions seeking the stable path of the Hamiltonian. Firstly this method
has the same probability to t the optimal path of the Hamiltonian system than the prob-
ability to select a given point on a continuous line, which is equal to zero. Secondly,
identication issue are overlooked in this estimation. This paper carefully deals with
both issues.
We pre-test and test Ramsey optimal policy versus time-consistent policy with the
reference new-Keynesian Phillips curve including an auto-regressive cost-push shock (Gali
(2015, chapter 5)).
Firstly, this paper proposes a pre-test of the two spanning conditions of Ramsey op-
timal policy versus time-consistent policy and (optimal) simple rules (Kollmann (2002)
and (2008) is a precursor for optimal simple rules simulations in models including the
new-Keynesian Phillips curve). The principle is to test the number of linearly indepen-
dent observed variables with stable dynamics predicted by Ramsey policy or by time-
consistent policy for any DSGE model. Ramsey optimal policy has richer dynamics than
time-consistent policy. It includes policy makers marginal condition with respect to
forward-looking variables such as ination. Time-consistent policy excludes these equa-
tions. Ramsey optimal policy rules respond to a number of variables equal to the number
of predetermined and of forward-looking variables. Time-consistent policy rules respond
to a number of variable equal to the number of predetermined variables only. For US data
from 1960 to 2006, time-consistent policy and (optimal) simple rule are strongly rejected
by pre-test with respect to Ramsey optimal policy.
Secondly, Feds preferences and monetary policy transmission mechanism are tested
for the model which passed the pre-test. The number of reduced form parameters is
larger with Ramsey optimal policy than with time-consistent policy although the number
of structural parameters, including central bank preferences, is the same. Hence, at
least one of the two equilibria is over-identied or under-identied. Because of the lower
number of non-collinear variables in time-consistent policy than in Ramsey optimal policy,
three identifying equations are missing in time-consistent policy. In the case of Ramsey
optimal policy, Feds preferences and monetary policy transmission channel structural
parameters are identied when the Feds discount factor is exogenously given, because
only one identifying equation is missing.
In the test of Ramsey optimal policy, the two key parameter estimates are not statis-
tically di¤erent from zero. The rst parameter is the slope of the new-Keynesian Phillips
curve (parameter ) which models the monetary policy transmission e¤ect of the pol-
icy instrument on ination. This result is perfectly in line with hundreds of estimates
of the parameter  in limited-information single-equation of the new-Keynesian Phillips
curve in Mavroeidis, Plagbord-Möller and Stocks (2014) Journal of Economic Literature
survey. In this paper, the evidence is obtained estimating a full-information structural
vector auto-regressive (VAR) of Ramsey optimal policy, including two equations: the
new-Keynesian Phillips curve monetary policy transmission mechanism and a represen-
tation of Ramsey optimal policy rule.
The second parameter is the Feds preference of the cost of changing the policy in-
strument. If the monetary policy transmission e¤ect is zero, even if the central bank is
2
willing to stabilize ination at any cost, it is not able to achieve this policy. There is
nothing counterfactual in these estimates.
Unconstrained VAR parameter estimates are close to the values of reduced form pa-
rameters computed from structural parameters estimates of Ramsey optimal policy. The
ination equation of the VAR has identical estimates in both cases. In the policy in-
strument equation of VAR, its persistence shifts from an unconstrained estimate equal
to 0:9 to a Ramsey optimal policy estimate close to a unit root. Ramsey optimal policy
predicts too much persistence of the policy instrument. Ad hoc additional assumptions
such as ination indexation and consumption habits in the new-Keynesian Phillips curve
would push towards even more persistence for Ramsey optimal policy, that is, an even
more sizable misspecication.
Section 2 presents Ramsey optimal policy and time-consistent policy estimation method.
Section 3 presents the the pre-test theory and its implementation on US data during
1960-2006. Section 4 tests Ramsey optimal policy. Section 5 evaluates the robustness to
misspecication of Ramsey optimal policy versus time-consistent policy. The last section
concludes.
2 The Monetary Policy Problem: The Case of an
E¢ cient Steady State
Galis (2015, chapter 5) reference model for Ramsey optimal policy considers the case of
an e¢ cient steady state. The welfare losses experienced by the representative household
are, up to a second-order approximation, proportional to:
v(0; u0) = maxfxt;tg
  1
2
E0
(
+1X
t=0
t
 
2t + xx
2
t
)
(1)
where xt represents the welfare-relevant output gap, i.e. the deviation between (log)
output and its e¢ cient level. t denotes the rate of ination between periods t  1 and t.
ut denotes a cost-push shock.  denotes the discount factor. Et denotes the expectation
operator. v(0; u0) denotes the optimal value function. Coe¢ cient x > 0 represents
the weight of the uctuations of the marginal cost of the rm (measured by the output
gap) relative to ination in the loss function. Coe¢ cient x > 0 is the relative cost
of the changing the policy instrument with respect to the costs of uctuations of the
policy target, which is ination. It is given by x =  where  is the coe¢ cient on the
marginal cost of the rm xt in the New Keynesian Phillips curve, and  is the elasticity of
substitution between goods. More generally, and stepping beyond the welfare-theoretic
justication for (1), one can interpret x as the weight attached by the central bank to
deviations of output from its e¢ cient level (relative to price stability) in its own loss
function, which does not necessarily have to coincide with the households. A structural
equation relating ination and the welfare-relevant output gap can be derived leading to
the new-Keynesian Phillips curve:
t = Et [t+1] + xt + ut where  > 0, 0 <  < 1 (2)
The central bank minimizes (1) subject to the sequence of constraints given by (2).
The cost push shock ut includes an exogenous auto-regressive component:
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ut = ut 1 + "u;t where 0 <  < 1 and "u;t i.i.d. normal N
 
0; 2u

(3)
where  denotes the auto-correlation parameter and "t is identically and independently
distributed (i.i.d.) according to a normal distribution with constant variance 2u.
2.1 Ramsey Optimal Policy
2.1.1 Solution using Lagrange Multipliers
A policy maker with a mandate for a new policy regime revised on date t = 0 (corre-
sponding to a structural break in econometrics) commits to Ramsey optimal policy from
the current date until a given known date T where the optimal policy is optimized again.
The duration T of commitment ranges from a minimal duration of two weeks between
o¢ cial meetings of the boards of governors for the European Central Bank up to ten to
twenty years of a stable monetary policy regime. Ramsey optimal policy can be solved
directly using Bellmans equation, substituting the law of motion of the economy into
the policy-makers loss function without Lagrange multipliers. With the Lagrange inter-
mediate computations, the Lagrangian of Ramsey optimal policy includes a sequence of
Lagrange multipliers t+1.
L =  E0
t=TX
t=0
t

1
2
 
2t + xx
2
t

+ t+1 (t   xt   t+1)

(4)
The law of iterated expectations has been used to eliminate the condition expectations
that appeared in each constraint. Because of the certainty equivalence principle for
determining optimal policy in the linear quadratic regulator including additive normal
random shocks (Simon (1956)), the expectations of random variables ut are set to zero
and do not appear in the Lagrangian.
The program includes given initial u0 and nal boundary conditions for the predeter-
mined forcing variable variable lim
t!+1
tut = 0. It also includes optimal initial and nal
boundary values of the forward-looking variable ination. These transversality conditions
minimize the optimal value of the central banks loss function at the initial and the nal
date:
@v(t; ut)
@t
= 0 = tt predetermined for t = f0; Tg , t = t for t = f0; Tg (5)
lim
T!+1
@v(T ; uT )
@T
= 0 = lim
T!+1
TT , lim
t!+1
T = lim
t!+1
T if T ! +1 (6)
We follow Gali (2015) and we consider the limit case where the revision for a new
policy regime happens in the innite horizon. Di¤erentiating the Lagrangian with respect
to the policy instrument (output gap xt) and to the policy target (ination t) yields the
rst order optimality conditions:
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@L
@xt
= 0) xxt   t+1 = 0 (7)
@L
@t
= 0) t + t+1   t = 0 (8)
0 = 0) x 1 =   
x
0 = 0 and 0 =  1 =   
x
x0 (9)
that must hold for t = 1; 2; ::: where 0 = 0, because the ination Euler equation
corresponding to period 0 is not an e¤ective constraint for the central bank choosing
its optimal plan in period 0. The former commitment to the value of the policy instru-
ment of the previous period x 1 is not an e¤ective constraint. The policy instrument is
predetermined at the value zero x 1 = 0 at the period preceding the commitment.
Combining the two optimality conditions to eliminate the Lagrange multipliers yields
the optimal initial anchor of forward ination 0 on the predetermined policy instrument
x0:
0 =  x

x0 (10)
and the central banks Euler equation for the periods following period 0, for t =
1; 2; 3:::
xt = xt 1   
x
t: (11)
The central banks Euler equation links recursively the future or current value of
central banks policy instrument xt to its current or past value xt 1, because of the
central banks relative cost of changing her policy instrument is strictly positive x > 0.
This non-stationary Euler equation adds an unstable eigenvalue in the central banks
Hamiltonian system including three laws of motion of one forward variable (ination t)
and of two predetermined variables (ut; xt) or (ut; t).
Ljungqvist and Sargent (2012, chapter 19) seek the stationary equilibrium process us-
ing the augmented discounted linear quadratic regulator (ADLQR) solution of the Hamil-
tonian system (Anderson, Hansen, McGrattan and Sargent (1996)) as an intermediate
step. Using the method of undetermined coe¢ cients, this solution seeks optimal negative-
feedback rule parameters FR=(F;R; Fu;R) function of structural parameters (x; ; ; )
satisfying the innite horizon transversality conditions. The policy instrument should be
exactly correlated with private sectors variables:
xt = F;R (x; ; )t + Fu;R (x; ; ; )ut: (12)
Ljungqvist and Sargent (2012, chapter 19) ADLQR intermediate step basis vectors
(t; ut) of the stable subspace or Ljungqvist and Sargent (2012, chapter 19) nal step
basis vectors (t; ut) and Galis (2015, chapter 5) basis vectors (xt; ut) include the non-
observable predetermined cost-push shock ut in their VAR(1) within the Hamiltonian
system (H). How to derive one representation from the other is described in the appendix.
2.1.2 Issues of Söderlinds (1999) Estimation Method.
Söderlind (1999) estimation method of Ramsey optimal policy faces two problems.
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Problem 1: Estimating the wrong model.
Söderlind (1999) estimates the Hamiltonian system outside its stable subspace. In our
case, it omits the stable subspace optimal rule and restriction: xt = F;Rt+Fu;Rut. It es-
timates instead the policy makers rst order equation. In Söderlinds method, the central
banks preferences parameter appears in a simple explicit linear form in the Hamiltonian
system of equations. It is easy to compute the likelihood of this vector-auto-regressive
(VAR) model.
In the general case, as soon as there are at least two endogenous controllable vari-
ables, the solution for (F;R; Fu;R) is an implicit function of central bank preferences and
monetary policy transmission parameters, given by Riccati and Sylvester equations. This
is the reason why the stable subspace optimal policy rule constraint is not handled in
Söderlinds estimation method.
It does not make sense to estimate optimal policy using the saddle-point equilibrium
Hamiltonian system omitting its stable subspace optimal rule constraint. The saddle-
point equilibrium Hamiltonian system is a ctitious intermediate computational step to
solve optimal policy. One can solve linear quadratic optimal control with Bellmans
equation to nd optimal negative-feedback rule parameters (F;R; Fu;R) directly, without
Lagrange multipliers. The probability that Söderlinds methods estimates the unique
path of optimal policy within the stable subspace is zero.
Problem 2: Identication issue.
Estimating a VAR with lagged dependent variable and non-observable auto-regressive
leads to a classic identication problem (Griliches (1967), Feve, Matheron, Poilly (2007)),
where two sets of parameters are observationally equivalent for the auto-correlation pa-
rameter of the cost-push shock (see appendix).
2.1.3 Solving Issues of Söderlinds (1999) Estimation Method.
In the case of a single controllable variable with explicit solutions for (F;R; Fu;R), it is
feasible to solve the issues raised by Söderlinds (1999) estimation method. This new
estimation method give insights and hope for further research with implicit solutions for
F based on matrix Riccati and Sylvester equations when there is at least two controllable
variables. Firstly, the stable subspace optimal rule constraint is complicated. But, sec-
ondly, it helps to remove a fundamental limited-information Griliches (1967) identication
issue for policy rules.
Firstly, we substitute the non-stationary Euler equation by the stationary optimal
rule including endogenous (F;R; Fu;R).
Secondly, we do a full-information estimation of the optimal policy rule and its trans-
mission mechanism, including all the equations of optimal policy for observable variables
(ination and the policy instrument). We use the stable subspace optimal rule constraint
to eliminate the auto-regressive shock in the VAR(1) in the ination equation and sub-
stitute it by the policy instrument. In this VAR(1), the auto-correlation parameter of the
shock appears inside the matrix of the auto-correlation of the observable variables (in-
ation and the policy instrument), but not in the residuals of this VAR, which are white
noise. The auto-correlation parameter of the shock appears into the residuals estimat-
ing of the ination equation, with lagged ination and auto-correlated cost-push shock,
(leading to Griliches identication problem) only because it is a limited-information es-
timation, estimating only the ination (transmission mechanism) equation of the model
without estimating jointly the optimal policy rule equation. This full-information method
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holds with an auto-correlated cost-push shock (with its parameter estimated): it does not
assume this auto-correlation is zero to obtain white noise in the full information VAR.
We suggest using the basis vectors (t; xt) of the stable subspace for the VAR(1)
representation within the Hamiltonian system, using the mathematical equivalence of
systems of equations for t = 1; 2; 3::: :
(H)
8>><>>:

t+1
ut+1

= (A+BFR)

t
ut

+

0
1

"t
xt = F;Rt + Fu;Rut
0 =  x x0 and u0 given
,
8>><>>:

t+1
xt+1

=M 1 (A+BF)M

t
xt

+M 1

0
1

"t
ut =
1
Fu;R
xt   F;RFu;Rt
0 =  x x0 and u0 given
(13)
with:
A+BFR=

1

  

F;R   1   Fu;R
0 


t
xt

=M 1

t
ut

withM 1 =

1 0
Fu;R F;R

Fu;R is eliminated using  1 Fu;R = (1  )R Fu;RF;R and F;R =
R
1 R

x
(see appendix
1):
M 1 (A+BF)M =

R (1  )R 1F;R
 (R   1)F;R + (1  )R

=

R (1  ) (1  R) x R x + (1  )R

with:
R


 
; x
+
; 
 

=
1  F

=
1
2

1 +
1

+
2
x

 
s
1
4

1 +
1

+
2
x
2
  1

= 
where the two invariant stable eigenvalues of the stable subspace are R denoted 
by Gali (2015) and  (appendix 2). The other representations of the VAR(1) including
the non-observable cost-push shocks ut amounts to estimate the VAR(1) as a partial
adjustment ination or output gap equation with serially correlated cost-push shocks ut.
These equations face a classic problem of identication and multiple equilibria, because
the auto-correlation of the dependent variable and of the disturbances are competing
to model persistence (Griliches (1967), Blinder (1986), McManus et al. (1994), Fève,
Matheron Poilly (2007), appendix ).
We eliminate the non-observable serially correlated cost-push shock ut with a change of
basis vectors (t; xt) including observable variables. Hence, we are able to t a structural
VAR(1) with the assumption of white noise shocks instead of serially correlated shocks
(Sims (1980)). Structural parameters are estimated with feasible generalized non-linear
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least squares for a system of equations. Theory-based constraints on the four reduced form
parameters of the matrixM 1 (A+BF)M imply that only three structural parameters
can be identied: ,R, F;R or ,R, x or ,  () ;  () for a given value of the discount
factor :
 () =
1  R
F;R
) x () =

R
1  R

1
F;R
 () : (14)
If initial values of ination and of the policy instrument (in deviation from their equi-
librium values) were perfectly measured at the date of commitment, the ratio x

would
be over-identied by the optimal initial anchor of forward ination on the predetermined
policy instrument equation:
x

=
 0
x0
: (15)
The semi-reduced form cost-push shock rule parameter Fu;R requires an identication
restriction, for example, setting a value for  (see appendix 2):
Fu;R () =
 1
1  RF;R < 0: (16)
The standard error u of cost-push shock is computed using the standard error of
residuals ";x of the output gap rule equation in the VAR(1). It requires an identication
restriction, because it depends on Fu;R:
u () =
";x
Fu;R ()
: (17)
The standard error of the measurement of the ination equation  (which is theo-
retically predicted to be zero) and its covariance with the cost push shock x = Fu;Rxu
are also available.
One identifying equation is missing in order to identify the remaining four structural
parameters (x; ; ; u) and the negative feedback rule parameter Fu;R. We set an iden-
tication restriction on the discount factor to a given value:  = 0:99 or  = 1 in the
estimations. One of the reason why an identication restriction is required for Ramsey
optimal policy is that the AR(1) cost-push shock ut is not observable. The usual practice
of DSGE modelers is to include a number of AR(1) processes equal to the number for-
ward variables, i.e. all prices and ows of quantities variables in their model. The larger
the number of non-observable AR(1) processes, the more likely identifying structural pa-
rameters of Ramsey optimal policy (including central bank preferences) would require
additional identication restrictions.
2.2 Time-Consistent Policy
Gali (2015, chapter 5) considers the case of a particular time-consistent policy (Cohen
and Michel (1988), Oudiz and Sachs (1985)) when the policy makers knows perfectly
the parameters of the policy transmission mechanism. The central bank minimizes its
loss function subject to the new-Keynesian Phillips curve and subject to two additional
constraints. These constraints forces the marginal value of the loss function with respect
to ination (the policy makers Lagrange multiplier on ination) to stick to the value
zero at all periods. Hence, this rule does not change if the policy maker optimizes at the
8
initial date or at any future date.
These constraints assume that both the private sector and the central bank commit
for ever to restricted policy rules where their policy instrument reacts only to the con-
temporary predetermined variable ut at all periods t, with a perfect correlation. These
time-consistent rules are determined by time-invariant rule parameters NTC and Fu;TC
to be optimally chosen for all periods, assuming common and complete knowledge of
structural parameters including preferences of both agents:
t = NTCut and xt = Fu;TCut (18)
Indeed, the central bank policy time-consistent rule has a representation where its
policy instruments responds only to current ination, after substitution of private sector
time-consistent rule:
xt = Fu;TCut = F;TCt with F;TC =
Fu;TC
NTC
(19)
The Central Bank commits for ever to a restricted time-consistent rule where the
policy instrument responds only to current ination or only to the current non-observable
cost-push shock with a perfect correlation. Time-consistent policy is the opposite of time-
inconsistent discretion, which is the ability of not sticking to any policy rules over time
because new problems arise that could not be anticipated. It is a recent mistake since
the 2000s to refer to time-inconsistent discretion for this solution instead of the initial
name of time-consistent policy given by researchers who invented them in the 80s.
In order to have policy rule parameters to be identied, the reduced form represen-
tations of the rules of the optimal policy reacts to a number of variables equal to the
number of predetermined variables. In Ramsey optimal policy, this number is equal to
two. It is equal to one with time-consistent policy. Ramsey optimal policy allows a
less-restricted, more-exible reduced form representations of its policy rules, where the
policy instruments responds to its lagged value in addition to current ination or current
cost-push shock. In practice, this rule has more room for exibility and adjustment due
to misspecication than rules of time-consistent policy.
We derive the solution of time-consistent monetary policy facing the new-Keynesian
Phillips curve according to Cohen and Michel (1988) and Oudiz and Sachs (1985). Their
solution slightly di¤ers from Gali (2015) who additionally assumes that the Central Bank
does not know the rules at future dates (see appendix). Substituting the private sectors
ination rule and the policy rule in the loss function:
max
f;xtg
  1
2
E0
+1X
t=0
t
 
2t + xx
2
t

= max
fFu;TC ;NTCg
  1
2
 
N2TC + xF
2
u;TC
 u20
1  2
The central bank rst order condition is:
0 = Nu;TC
@Nu;TC
@Fu;TC
+ xFu;TC
F;TC =
Fu;TC
NTC
=   1
x
@Nu;TC
@Fu;TC
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Substituting the private sectors ination rule and the policy rule in the ination law
of motion leads to the following relation between NTC on date t, NTC;t+1 and Fu;TC :
t = Et [t+1] + xt + ut )
NTCut = NTC;t+1ut + Fu;TCut + ut
NTC = NTC;t+1 + Fu;TC + 1
In the reference Oudiz and Sachs(1985) dynamic Nash equilibrium, the central bank
foresees that NTC;t+1 = NTC in its optimization (see appendix):
NTC =
Fu;TC + 1
1   =
F;TCNTC + 1
1   )
@Nu;TC
@Fu;TC
=

1  
The endogenous rule parameters are increasing function of the central bank cost of
changing the policy instrument x. They are bounded by limit values of x 2 ]0;+1[:
0 <
t;TC
ut
= NTC(x)
+
=
x (1  )
x (1  )2 + 2
< N =
1
1  
 1

<
xt;TC
ut
= Fu;TC(x)
+
=
 
x (1  )2 + 2
< 0
 1 < xt;TC
t;TC
= F;TC(x)
+
=
Fu;TC
NTC
=
 
x (1  ) <
 
x
< 0
For an innite cost of changing the policy instrument x ! +1, we label this
equilibrium as "laissez-faire" because two policy rule parameters are both equal to zero
F;TC = 0 = Fu;TC . The policy instrument xt is set to zero at all dates: it is eliminated in
the model. It corresponds to the maximal initial response of ination (in absolute values)
to cost-push shock Nut = 11 ut for time-consistent policy.
For the limit case of a zero cost of changing the policy instrument (x ! 0), the
policy instrument (output gap) has its largest response to cost-push shock x0 =   1u0 so
that the policy target (ination) does not respond to the cost-push shock (NTC is zero).
The policy instrument (the output gap) xt is exactly negatively correlated (F;TC < 0)
with the policy target (ination) t. When increasing the central banks preferences (x)
for the relative cost of changing the output gap from zero to innity, the strictly negative
rule parameter F;TC increases from minus innity to zero. There is one stable eigenvalue
and one unstable eigenvalue:
0 <  < 1 <
1

 TC = 1  F;TC

< +1: (20)
The welfare loss of time-consistent policy vTC as a proportion of the limit maximal
value of the welfare loss with the largest volatility of ination (laissez-faire) vLF turns to
be equal to the ratio of ination under time-consistent policy to ination under laissez-
faire. It increases from zero to one when the cost of changing the policy instrument
increases from zero to innity:
0 <
vTC
vLF
=
N2TC + xF
2
u;TC
N2
=
x (1  )2
x (1  )2 + 2
=
NTC
N
=
t;TC
t;LF
< 1
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3 Pre-test of Ramsey versus Time-Consistent Policy
and Optimal Simple Rule
3.1 A Bifurcation of the Economy Dynamical System
This theoretical section adds new analytical results with respect to Gali (2015, chapter
5). It compares Taylor rule parameter responding to ination for Ramsey versus time-
consistent policy (only presented for time-consistent policy in Gali (2015)). They have op-
posite signs. They correspond respectively to negative-feedback versus positive-feedback
rule. This section compares the ination eigenvalue for Ramsey versus time-consistent
policy. It is only presented for Ramsey policy in Gali (2015). We provide their functional
form depending on structural parameters which is not done in Gali (2015) but useful for
a correct estimation. Ramsey optimal policy eigenvalue (R) is stable. Time-consistent
policy eigenvalue (TC) is unstable.
Shifting from Ramsey policy to time-consistent policy corresponds to a bifurcation of
the dynamic system of the economy. This section shows that optimal simple rule corre-
sponds to reduced form of time-consistent policy. These major di¤erences are overlooked
in Gali (2015). They provide the key idea of our pre-test of the maximal number of vari-
ables predicted to evolve in a stable VAR for Ramsey policy versus for time-consistent
policy.
Simple rule assume that there is no policy-maker loss function nor welfare function
and that the policy instruments are forward variables. For simple rule, when ination
and the policy instrument are forward variables, only the cost-push auto-regressive shock
is a predetermined variable with an exogenous stable eigenvalue . Blanchard and Kahns
(1980) determinacy condition imply that the controllable eigenvalue, indexed by S for
"simple rule": S =
1 F;S

should be unstable (jSj > 1). This implies constraints on
the values of the ination rule parameter F;S =
1 

. Because of the simple rule stable
subspace is of dimension one, omitting the identifying restriction Fu;S = 0 would imply
that both rule parameters F;S and Fu;S are not identied.
Proposition 1: In Galis (2015) model, an optimal simple rule minimizing the central
bank loss function is a reduced form of time-consistent policy.
Proof: For a given monetary policy transmission mechanism (; ; ; u), a simple
rule with a strictly negative ination parameter F;S, forcing an unstable eigenvalue S 2i
1

;+1
h
by positive feedback, is the reduced form of time-consistent policy with a unique
central bank preference parameter x given by:
F;S = F;TC =   
x
1
1   < 0 =) x =  

F;S
1
1   (21)
The remaining cases of simple rules with positive rule parameter F;S 2

0; 1 

 [
1+

;+1 forcing an unstable eigenvalue S 2 h1; 1h[ ] 1; 1[ by positive feedback do
not minimize a central bank loss function in time-consistent policy. For F;S 2

0; 1 


,
these simple rules imply a jump of ination larger than in laissez-faire (NS > N). For
F;S 2

1+

;+1, these simple rules imply a jump of ination with an opposite sign
with respect to laissez-faire (NS < 0 < N). Those simple rule solution are never optimal
simple rule nor reduced form of time-consistent policy. When the policy instrument is
a forward variable, simple rule parameter F;S is never the reduced form rule parameter
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of the Ramsey optimal policy ination rule parameter F;R forcing a stable eigenvalue
S 2 ]0; [ by negative feedback, where the policy instrument is predetermined. Kollmann
(2002 and 2008) is a precursor for computing optimal simple rules with new-Keynesian
Phillips curve models. Q.E.D.
Sargent and Ljunqgvists (2012) LQR intermediate step allows a direct comparison be-
tween the reduced form ination rule parameters F;TC of time-consistent policy (respec-
tively F;R of Ramsey optimal policy), which is a¢ ne negative function of the eigenvalue
TC (respectively R):
F;TC =   1
1  

x
and TC =
1

  

F;TC =
1

+
1

1
1  
2
x
(22)
F;R =
1

  

R and R =
1
2

1 +
1

+
2
x

 
s
1
4

1 +
1

+
2
x
2
  1

(23)
Figure 1 plots the eigenvalue TC of time-consistent policy (and respectively the eigen-
value R of Ramsey optimal policy) as non-linear decreasing (respectively increasing)
function of the relative cost of changing the policy instrument x for the estimated pa-
rameters  = 0:995,  = 0:340 for a given  = 0:99 of the Ramsey optimal policy
model during Volcker-Greenspans Fed starting 1979q3-2006q2 (see estimation section,
with estimated R = 0:856 and x = 4:552). For a minimal cost of changing the policy
instrument, the eigenvalue R tends to zero for Ramsey optimal policy and TC tends to
innity for time-consistent policy. For an innite cost of changing the policy instrument:
the eigenvalue R tends to one for Ramsey optimal policy and TC tends to 1= > 1 for
time-consistent policy.
Figure 2 plots ination rule parameter F;TC of time-consistent policy (and respec-
tively F;R of Ramsey optimal policy) as non-linear decreasing (respectively increasing)
function of the relative cost of changing the policy instrument x for the same estimated
parameters than for gure 1 (with estimated F;R = 0:447 and x = 4:552). For a min-
imal cost of changing the policy instrument, the ination rule parameter F;R tends to
1= and F;TC tends to minus innity for time-consistent policy. For an innite cost of
changing the policy instrument, the ination rule parameter F;R tends to (1  )= for
Ramsey optimal policy and F;TC tends to zero for time-consistent policy.
Figures 1 and 2: Eigenvalues  and ination rule parameter F function of x for
Ramsey optimal policy (solid line) and time-consistent policy (dash line)
0 2 4 6 8 10
0
1
2
3
Cost of changing policy instrument
Eigenvalue
2 4 6 8 10
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
Cost of changing policy instrument
Rule parameter
Table 1 summarizes the opposite properties of Ramsey optimal policy versus time-
consistent policy and simple rule when ination is a forward variable.
Table 1: Ramsey optimal policy, time-consistent policy and simple rule
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Policy Predetermined ination t Forward ination t
Ramsey
2 predetermined: ut; t
stable subspace dim=2
1 forward: xt
x 2 ]0;+1[
F;R 2

1 

; 1


R 2 ]0; 1[
negative feedback
2 predetermined: ut; xt or t
stable subspace dim=2
1 forward: t
x 2 ]0;+1[
F;R 2

1 

; 1


R 2 ]0; 1[
negative feedback
Time-
Consistent
2 predetermined: ut; t
stable subspace dim=2
1 forward: xt
x 2 ]0;+1[
F 2

1 

; 1


 2 ]0; 1[
negative feedback
1 predetermined: ut
stable subspace dim=1
2 forward: t; xt
x 2 ]0;+1[
F;TC 2 ] 1; 0[ ; Fu;TC = 0
TC 2
i
1

;+1
h
positive feedback
Simple rule
2 predetermined: ut; t
stable subspace dim=2
1 forward: xt
 2 ] 1; 1[
F 2

1 

; 1+


negative feedback
.
1 predetermined: ut
stable subspace dim=1
2 forward: t; xt
S 2
i
1

;+1
h
[
h
1; 1

h
[ ] 1; 1[
F;S 2 ] 1; 0[ [

0; 1 

 [ 1+

;+1
positive feedback
Fu;S = 0
Ramsey optimal policy: limit cases.
For very small or very large values of x, time-consistent policy and Ramsey optimal
policy paths and hence central bank losses are identical. Optimizing at later periods
leads to a negligible deviation from the optimal path chosen at the initial period. When
x ! 0, ination t tends to zero at all dates for any initial value of the cost-push
shock u0 for Ramsey optimal policy and time-consistent policy. For Ramsey optimal
policy, the policy rules are F;R =
1 

and Fu;R =
 F;R
1 2 . For time-consistent policy,
the policy rule parameter F;TC !  1 and Fu;TC = 0. When x ! +1, t tends to
laissez-faire ination 1
1 ut at all dates for any initial value of the cost-push shock u0
for both Ramsey and time-consistent policy. For Ramsey optimal policy, the policy rules
are F;R = 1 =   Fu;R. For time-consistent policy, the policy rule parameters are both
equal to zero (laissez-faire equilibrium) F;TC = Fu;TC = 0.
Although the equilibrium paths of time-consistent policy and Ramsey optimal policy
are the same and evolve in a subspace of dimension one, the distinct policy rule parameters
for time-consistent policy versus Ramsey optimal policy reects that there exists a two-
dimension stable subspace where Ramsey optimal policy path is surrounded by stable
out-of-equilibrium paths which does not exist for time-consistent policy and for laissez-
faire. This matters for robustness to specication when the central bank does not know
exactly the parameters of the monetary policy transmission mechanism.
Timeless-perspective assumes that the ination jump  20 occurred for example 20
periods before, even if the cost-push shock u0 occurs now. This is equivalent to con-
sider as the current ination jump is 0 = 20, the value of ination 20 periods ahead.
Hence, ination jump is very small and very close to the long run value of ination.
Timeless-perspective is equivalent to a time-consistent policy with a very low cost x of
changing the policy rate and with a maximal volatility of the policy instrument. Timeless-
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perspective simulation raises two issues. Firstly, it is inconsistent with optimization. The
ad hoc near-zero jump of ination 0 = 20, is optimally consistent with a large volatil-
ity of the policy instrument related to near-zero cost of changing the policy instrument
(x ! 0). Timeless-perspective is usually assumed without a large volatility of the pol-
icy instrument, corresponding to a non-negligible cost of changing the policy instrument
x. Second, it assumes away tests of real world structural breaks of new commitment.
Timeless-perspective simulations explains Volckers structural break in 1979-1982 by Mar-
tin chairman of the Fed during 1951-1970.
When the nite time-horizon for the end of the commitment is short (for example,
the central bank re-optimize every two periods (two-quarters or every two-weeks), Ramsey
optimal policy is close to a time-consistent path. Finally, in the case where the forward-
looking variables are not controllable with stable dynamics, Ramsey optimal policy and
time-consistent policy are identical.
3.2 Null Hypothesis of the Pre-Test
Time-consistent policy is described by a permanent anchor of ination on the output
gap and by two AR(1) processes of ination and of the output gap. Variables, such
as ination (t + ) are not computed as deviations of equilibrium (already denoted
t). Estimates of equilibrium values (; x) are then sample mean values found in the
estimates of intercepts. The reduced form time-consistent policy policy rule to be tested
(which corresponds to a permanent anchor of ination on the output gap) allows to
estimate the reduced form time-consistent policy rule parameter F;TC :
xt + x
 = F;TC (t + ) + (x   F;TC) + "x;t with (24)
"x;t = 0 for all dates, R2 = 1 and F;TC < 0
The simple correlation between the output gap and ination provides another estimate
of the time-consistent policy rule parameter F;TC = rx";x="; < 0. It is equal to the
one found using the ratio of standard errors of residuals of the AR(1) estimations for
ination and for the output gap : F;TC =  ";x="; only if the following condition
is satised: rx =  1. Testing time-consistent policy against Ramsey optimal policy
amounts to test the perfect negative correlation between the output gap and ination:
rx =  1. Because of test of a simple correlation exactly equal to 1 cannot be performed,
we can perform a one-sided test of a composite null hypothesis of a simple correlation
very close to minus one (subscript TC is for time-consistent policy):
H0;TC : rx <  0:99 (25)
However, this non-perfect correlation may be due to measurement errors. Hence, the
key test of time-consistent policy versus Ramsey optimal policy is a test of the auto-
correlation of residuals of the output gap policy rule function of ination. In time-
consistent policy, errors should not be auto-correlated. If they are auto-correlated, this
alternative hypothesis suggests that at least the lagged policy instrument is missing in
the regression of the policy rule, which is exactly a reduced form of the Ramsey optimal
policy rule (which also depends on ination):
H0;TC : ";x = 0 for "x;t = ";x"x;t + t with t i.i.d. (26)
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Additionally, the two AR(1) process for ination and the output gap are:
t + 
 =  (t 1 + ) + (1  ) +NTC"u;t with "u;t i.i.d. (27)
xt + x
 =  (xt 1 + x) + (1  )x + F;TCNTC"u;t with "u;t i.i.d. (28)
If the two previous tests did not reject the null hypothesis, we can perform a third
test that the auto-correlation coe¢ cients are identical for ination and for the output
gap:
H0;TC :  = x (29)
If this hypothesis is not rejected, the AR(1) estimates identify the auto-correlation
parameter of the non-observable cost-push shock: . The ratio of the standard errors of
residuals of each AR(1) estimations of ination and output gap provides another estimate
of F;TC , (if rx = 1) with a negative sign restriction predicted by theory, and grounded
by positive feedback:
F;TC =  ";x="; (30)
The variance 2"; of perturbations of the ination AR(1) process is:
2"; = N
2
TC
2
";u ) N2TC =
2";
2";u
(31)
Unfortunately, the cross equations covariance ";x between the residuals of both
AR(1) process of ination and of the output gap does not allow to identify either the
private sector parameter NTC anchoring ination on the cost-push shock or the variance
of the cost-push shock 2";u. The simple correlation between the two residuals is predicted
to be exactly negatively correlated (r";x =  1):
";x =  ";x
";
2";
2";u
2";u =  ";x"; < 0: (32)
Finally, only one structural parameter related to the cost-push shock  and one re-
duced form parameter F;TC are identied. However, there remain four structural pa-
rameters parameters. For exogenous central bank preferences x, these parameters are
; ; x; 
2
";u. For a welfare loss function, as x =


, these parameters are ; ; ; 2";u
where  is the elasticity of substitution between goods. It is not possible to identify at
least one of these four parameters separately, because the identied parameter F;TC does
not depend only on one of these four structural parameters:
F;TC =
 1
1  

x
< 0: (33)
Three identifying equations are missing in the case of time-consistent policy instead of
one identifying equation in the case of Ramsey optimal policy. In the case of endogenous
central bank preferences (welfare loss function case,) it is not possible to identify  the
elasticity of substitution between goods. In the case of exogenous central bank prefer-
ences, it is not possible to disentangle exogenous central bank preferences x from the
monetary transmission mechanism parameter  (the identical discount rate  is identical
to central banks and to the private sector). We cannot disentangle whether an estimated
impulse response function is obtained by a large cost x of changing the policy instrument
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and a large marginal e¤ect  of the policy instrument on the policy target or by a low
cost x with a large response of the instrument in the policy rule and a low marginal
e¤ect  of the policy instrument on the policy target.
This is unfortunate because the main value added of the estimation of optimal time-
consistent policy with respect to the estimation of a reduced form positive feedback
simple-rule parameter F;TC is to estimate central bank preferences x.
Finally, the tests of reduced form parameters of bivariate VAR(1) of time-consistent
policy versus Ramsey optimal policy are not feasible. The exact multicollinearity (exact
correlation) between regressors (current output gap and current ination) imply a bivari-
ate VAR(1) with innite coe¢ cients with denominator including the term 1  r2x equal
to zero: 
xt+1
t+1

=

+1  1
 1 +1

xt
t

+

NTC
F;TCNTC

"t (34)
The time-consistent policy equilibrium predicts that out-of-equilibrium behavior cor-
responds to a non-stationary bivariate VAR including one unstable eigenvalue TC and
one stable eigenvalue , which cannot be estimated. By contrast, the stationary struc-
tural VAR(1) of output gap and ination with Ramsey optimal policy allows to identify
a larger number of structural parameters.
xt+1
t+1

=

a b
c d

xt
t

+

Fu;R
0

"t
Two additional reduced form parameters (b; c) are available, because the stable sub-
space of the VAR process is of dimension two with Ramsey optimal policy instead of
dimension one with time-consistent policy.
3.3 Pre-test of Feds Ramsey versus Time-consistent policy
The annualized quarter-on-quarter rate of ination and the congressional budget o¢ ce
(CBO) measure of the output gap are taken from Mavroeidis (2010) online appendix
(detailed information at the end of this papers appendix). The pre-Volcker sample covers
the period 1960q1 to 1979q2 and the Volcker-Greenspan sample runs until 2006q2. The
period of Paul Volckers tenure is 1979q3 to 1987q2. The period of Alan Greenspans
tenure is 1987q3 to 2006q1.
According to Gali (2015, chapter 5), a structural break is related either to the be-
ginning of a permanent anchor of forward ination on output gap in the case of time-
consistent policy or to an initial anchor (jump) of forward ination on output gap in the
case of Ramsey optimal policy. Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000) and Mavroeidis (2010)
consider the beginning of Paul Volckers mandate 1979q3 as a structural break. Givens
(2012) considers 1982q1 as a structural break, after 1981 fall of ination and before the
1982 recession. Matthes (2015) estimation of the private sectors beliefs regarding central
bank regimes also points to 1982q1 as a structural break. Table 2 presents summary
statistics before and after the 1979q3 and 1982q1 structural breaks.
Table 2: Summary statistics of ination and output gap for 1979q3 and
1982q1 breaks.
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Break obs. var. mean min max
before79 78 t 4:39
(2:71)
0:59 11:79
before79 78 xt 0:47
(2:59)
 4:97 6:10
before82 88 t 4:86
(2:90)
0:59 11:79
before82 88 xt 0:20
(2:59)
 4:97 6:10
after79 108 t 3:18
(2:03)
0:64 10:93
after79 108 xt  1:11
(2:07)
 7:95 3:01
after82 98 t 2:64
(1:08)
0:64 5:61
after82 98 xt  1:03
(2:12)
 7:95 3:01
Standard deviations in parentheses.
The mean of ination and of output gap are lower during Volcker-Greenspan than
before Volcker. Excluding the period 1979q3 to 1981q4, in particular the sharp disination
which occurred during 1981 (gure 3), the standard error of ination decreases by half
from 2.03 to 1.08 .
Table 3: Pre-tests of ination and output gap permanent anchor correla-
tion for 1979q3 and 1982q1 breaks.
Break obs rx Low 95% r p R2x F;TC c ";x
before79 78  0:13  0:21 < 0:001 0:02  0:13
(0:11)
1:03
(0:56)
0:92
(0:04)
before82 108  0:30  0:42 < 0:001 0:09  0:30
(0:09)
 0:14
(0:35)
0:91
(0:04)
after79 88  0:24  0:31 < 0:001 0:06  0:22
(0:09)
1:25
(0:53)
0:92
(0:05)
after82 98  0:40  0:53 < 0:001 0:16  0:78
(0:18)
1:03
(0:52)
0:89
(0:05)
The pre-tests of the null hypothesis of a quasi perfect negative correlation H0 : rx <
 0:99 between observed ination and observed output gap are rejected. The test uses
Fishers Z transformation using the procedure corr with the software SAS. The threshold
of the composite null hypothesis  0:99 is far away from the 95% single tail condence
interval, where the lowest 95% condence limit reported in table 3 is at most equal to
 0:53 for the period after 1981q4 (gure 4). The opposite null hypothesisH0 : r (xt; t) =
0 is not rejected before 1979q3. time-consistent policy predicts a perfect correlation
for the anchor of ination expectations with the output gap. If the time-consistent
policy equilibrium occurred before 1979q3, we do not reject the null hypothesis H0 :
r (Et 1 (t) ; t) = 0 that the rational expectations of ination are orthogonal to observed
ination.
The pre-tests of the null hypothesis of the auto-correlation of residuals H0 : ";x = 0
are strongly rejected, with a point estimate at least equal to 0:89 (gure 5). These tests
gives a hint of model misspecication. They suggest an omitted lagged policy instrument
in the policy rule. When it is included in Ramsey optimal policy rule, the R2 increases
from 16% (table 3, last line) to 93% (table 6, last line) beginning in 1982q1.
Figure 3. Ination and output gap anchor correlation (insert).
Table 4 investigates the auto-correlation and unit roots of ination and output gap.
Table 4: Auto-correlation and AR(1) statistics for 1979q3 and 1982q1
breaks.
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Break obs. var. r R2  c " " DF PP
before79 78 t 0:86 0:74 0:88
(0:06)
0:62
(0:30)
1:38  0:22
(0:12)
0:55 0:41
before79 78 xt 0:93 0:86 0:93
(0:04)
0:03
(0:11)
0:99 0:26
(0:11)
0:20 0:33
before82 88 t 0:88 0:78 0:88
(0:05)
0:63
(0:28)
1:35  0:19
(0:11)
0:34 0:23
before82 88 xt 0:92 0:85 0:93
(0:04)
 0:03
(0:11)
1:03 0:23
(0:11)
0:27 0:37
after79 108 t 0:89 0:79 0:85
(0:04)
0:42
(0:16)
0:93  0:27
(0:09)
0:04 0:01
after79 108 xt 0:94 0:88 0:94
(0:03)
 0:07
(0:08)
0:70 0:34
(0:09)
0:11 0:25
after82 98 t 0:64 0:41 0:59
(0:07)
1:06
(0:21)
0:83  0:20
(0:10)
0:00 0:00
after82 98 xt 0:96 0:92 0:95
(0:03)
 0:02
(0:07)
0:60 0:35
(0:09)
0:07 0:35
The output gap and ination are highly auto-correlated (respectively 0.93 and 0.86),
except when ination excludes the 1981 disination for the period after 1981q4. For
the period 1982q1 to 2006q2, the ination auto-correlation coe¢ cient falls in the 95%
condence interval 0:6  0:14 and it is statistically di¤erent from the output gap auto-
correlation coe¢ cient in the 95% condence interval 0:95  0:06 (gures 4 and 5). As
the time-consistent policy equilibrium predicts that the auto-correlation of the output
gap and of ination should be the same, this is an additional test against time-consistent
policy, which holds for the period 1982q1 to 2006q2.
There is a negative auto-correlation of residuals " for ination and a (statistically
signicant at the 5% level) positive auto-correlation of residuals for the output gap. The
column DF reports the p-value of the Dickey-Fuller test of unit root with one lag without
trend. The column PP reports the p-value of the Phillips-Perron test of unit root, which
takes into account auto-correlation, with one lag without trend. The null hypothesis of
a unit root is rejected for ination after 1979q2 and after 1981q4.
4 A New Test of Feds Ramsey Optimal Policy
Table 5 presents estimates of structural parameters, with small changes for estimates with
two given values for the discount factor  = 1 or  = 0:99 for the Volcker-Greenspan
period. Estimates are found using three structural VAR estimations for (; R; F;R), 
; R;
x


and (;  () ; x ()).
The goodness of t indicators (coe¢ cients of determinationR2) of the Ramsey optimal
policy structural VAR(1) are far larger than for time-consistent policy rules. However,
the cost-push shock faces is extremely persistent, close to a unit root, with  estimate
close to one. The new-Keynesian Phillips curve parameter  is not signicantly di¤erent
from zero at the 5% level, as in many estimates of Mavroeidis, Plagbord-Möller, Stock
(2014) limited-information single-equation estimations. The Feds preference parameter
x is not signicantly di¤erent from zero at the 5% level, as well as the reduced form
rule parameter F;R. However, the ratio x is statistically signicant when starting the
estimation in 1979q3. We check another property which has never been done in previous
estimations concerning Ramsey optimal initial anchor of ination. Ramsey optimal initial
anchor  0
x0
=  5 is not in the condence interval of x

for the period after 1979, but it
is within the condence interval of x

for the period after 1982.
Table 5: Tests of Ramsey optimal policy structural parameters for given
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discount factor  (excluding periods with conjugate complex roots).
Break  R F;R x
 0
x0
  () x () Fu;R () u ()
after79 0:995
(0:024)
 0:857
(0:054)
0:447
(0:292)
13:375
(6:627)
 5 1 0:321
(0:303)
4:296
(5:447)
 3:027 0:229
after79 0:995
(0:024)
0:857
(0:054)
0:447
(0:292)
13:375
(6:627)
 5 0:99 0:340
(0:314)
4:552
(5:703)
 2:861 0:242
after82 1:011
(0:015)
0:560
(0:079)
0:189
(0:121)
6:729
(3:932)
0:55 1 2:325
(1:710)
15:64
(19:22)
 0:436 1:562
after82 1:011
(0:015)
0:560
(0:079)
0:189
(0:121)
6:729
(3:932)
0:55 0:99 2:354
(1:726)
15:84
(19:44)
 0:431 1:583
We compare two observationally equivalent representations of the reduced form of the
policy rule of Ramsey optimal policy for the period after 1979q3, with the rule parameter
Fu;R () identied with the identication restriction  = 0:99. The rst one includes the
reduced form parameters of the structural VAR(1) of observable variables. The second
one is the ADLQR intermediate representation including the non-observable cost-push
shock:
xt = 0:995xt 1   0:064t 1   2:861"u;t and xt = 0:447t   2:861ut for  = 0:99 (35)
Although both representations look di¤erent, in particular with the opposite sign of
the policy rule parameter related to current or lagged ination, they are observation-
ally equivalent within the Hamiltonian system of equations taking into account the stable
subspace constraint.
By contrast, the reduced form policy rule for time-consistent policy would be for the
period after 1979q3:
xt =  0:22t (36)
The policy instrument responds to two variables for Ramsey stable subspace of dimen-
sion two. The policy instrument responds to one variable in the time-consistent policy
stable subspace of dimension one.
Another check never done in the existing literature is to compare the reduced form
parameters of Ramsey optimal policy with parameters of an unconstrained VAR (table
6). Goodness of t R2 are very close for the structural Ramsey optimal policy VAR
and the unconstrained VAR. The ination equation of the VAR does not change. The
second equation of the VAR(1) is a representation of the optimal policy rule. Ramsey
optimal policy over-estimates the persistence of the output gap: its VAR auto-correlation
parameter shifts from 0:93 to 1. There is also a small decline of the e¤ect of lagged
ination on the output gap and with a fall of the constant.
The increase of R2 of the VAR(1) including cross-correlations with respect to the
R2 obtained with the AR(1) process, denoted R2, is at most of 1% for each equations.
This is reected in the impulse response functions which are not statistically signicant for
cross-correlation even in the most favorable case of after 1981q4 with a parameter  0:17
for the output gap policy rule. In the unconstrained VAR, the policy target (ination)
does not depend on the policy instrument (output gap) in Galis (2015) Ramsey optimal
policy subject to the new-Keynesian Phillips curve according to the t-test after 1979q2
and after 1981q4. As seen in table 8, there is no Granger causality of output gap on
ination in the reduced form VAR(1).
Hand in hand with a small contribution of cross-correlations is so small, the auto-
correlation coe¢ cients for each equations of the unconstrained VAR(1) are nearly identical
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to the ones of AR(1) equations of ination and of the output gap.
The remaining auto-correlation of residuals of the unconstrained VAR(1) is not neg-
ligible. The p-value of the Lagrange multiplier test of auto-correlation of order 1 of
residuals of both equations are for each period in chronological order: 0:02, 0:04, 0:00
and 0:00. One does not reject the auto-correlation of residuals at the 5% level, with
very low p-value for the Volcker-Greenspan period. This auto-correlation of residuals
test suggests a misspecication of Ramsey optimal policy subject to the new-Keynesian
Phillips curve during the Volcker-Greenspan period. Lags of order two and/or including
omitted regressors may improve the specication of the unconstrained VAR(1). This sug-
gests a related structural VAR of Ramsey optimal policy subject to another transmission
mechanism than the new-Keynesian Phillips curve.
Table 6: Ination and output gap structural VAR(1) reduced form versus
unconstrained VAR (U)
Break obs. var. S/U t 1 xt 1 c " R2 R2 
after79 108 t S 0:85
0:85
0:009
0:001
0:428
(0:16)
0:793 0:857
(0:054)
U 0:85
(0:04)
0:00
(0:04)
0:43
(0:16)
 0:27
(0:09)
0:79 0:00 0:85
after79 108 xt S  0:064 0:999 0:198
(0:121)
0:888 0:995
(0:024)
U  0:084
(0:03)
0:917
(0:03)
0:17
(0:11)
0:29
(0:09)
0:89 0:01 0:92
after82 98 t S 0:56  0:03 1:086
(0:21)
0:416 0:560
(0:079)
U 0:56
(0:07)
 0:04
(0:04)
1:09
(0:21)
 0:17
(0:10)
0:42 0:01 0:54
after82 98 xt S  0:084 1:005 0:259
(0:14)
0:919 1:011
(0:015)
U  0:17
(0:05)
0:91
(0:03)
0:38
(0:14)
0:30
(0:09)
0:92 0:01 0:933
For the period before Volcker-Greenspan, table 7 presents the unconstrained VAR
estimations. There is a fall of the auto-correlation of ination from 0:857 starting 1979q3
to 0:560 starting 1982q1, which is a major di¤erence of correlations before versus during
Volcker-Greenspan. Before Volcker-Greenspan, as the auto-correlation of ination and
of the output gap are close to the same 0:9 values, this opened a possibility for a VAR
with complex roots. The imaginary components of the eigenvalues are small. But they
contradict the assumption of an exogenous real auto-correlation coe¢ cient for the cost-
push shock before 1979q2 and before 1981q4. Hence, before Volcker-Greenspan, one
cannot identify structural parameters of Ramsey optimal policy. The estimations does not
converge for the structural VAR(1) using non-linear estimation before Volcker-Greenspan
period.
Table 7: Ination and output gap unconstrained VAR(1) before 1979q3
and 1982q1 breaks (periods with conjugate roots).
Break obs. var. t 1 xt 1 c " R2 dR2 ; jj
before79 78 t 0:89
(0:06)
0:09
(0:06)
0:54
(0:30)
 0:26
(0:11)
0:75 0:01
0:90
0:08i
,0:91
before79 78 xt  0:09
(0:04)
0:91
(0:04)
0:41
(0:21)
0:21
(0:11)
0:87 0:01
0:90
0:08i
,0:91
before82 88 t 0:89
(0:05)
0:06
(0:06)
0:55
(0:29)
 0:22
(0:11)
0:79 0:01
0:90
0:07i
,0:90
before82 88 xt  0:08
(0:04)
0:91
(0:04)
0:39
(0:21)
0:17
(0:11)
0:85 0:01
0:90
0:07i
,0:90
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We nally investigate Granger causality in the unconstrained VAR (table 8). There
are larger correlation from lagged ination to output gap than from lagged output gap to
ination, although those correlation coe¢ cient are far beyond auto-correlation coe¢ cients
except after 1981q1 for the auto-correlation of ination. They are related to the partial
correlations of the unconstrained VAR(1). We report the p-values of Granger causality
Wald test that the cross-variables coe¢ cient is zero in the two columns GCW in table
8, for comparison with simple cross-correlations. Even though the simple correlation of
ination with lagged output gap increased for periods more and more recent in table 5,
their partial e¤ect in the VAR including lagged ination is small enough to reject Granger
causality of the output gap to ination, in particular for the Volcker-Greenspan period.
By contrast, Granger causality of ination to the output gap is not rejected at the 5%
level.
Table 8: Ination and output gap cross-correlogram for 1979q3 and 1982q1
breaks and Granger Causality.
Break obs. GCW r (t 1; xt) rtxt r (t+1; xt) GCW
before79 78 0:03  0:21  0:13  0:03 0:15
before82 88 0:02  0:31  0:24  0:15 0:29
after79 108 0:01  0:33  0:30  0:24 0:99
after82 98 0:00  0:47  0:40  0:33 0:34
5 Robustness to Misspecication: Ramsey vs Time-
Consistent
There is a lot of uncertainty on the estimates of the slope  of the new-Keynesian Phillips
curve in this paper and in limited-information single-equation estimations, which is often
found not to be statistically di¤erent from zero in Mavroeidis et al. (2014). There are
also measurement errors of the output gap and of ination. First, gross domestic product
(GDP) implicit price deator may di¤er from various measures of core ination which
is the target of central banks. Substracting the changes in the quality of goods in the
increase of prices is not done with a perfect accuracy. National accountants may change
the scope of GDP over time, which also changes the price deator. For example, they in-
cluded investment in intangible assets after 2006. The current measure of output does not
correspond to the nal measure after revisions by national accountants up to three years
after. Output gap can be computed using di¤erent methods leading to distinct values,
in particular when there is uncertainty on structural breaks on the trend of productivity
growth, as in 1973 and in 2007.
Time-consistent policy and optimal simple rules assume a perfect knowledge of the
monetary policy transmission parameters by the central bank. This raises the question
of their robustness to misspecication. Figure 7 (respectively gure 8) represents impulse
response functions of output gap and ination after a small cost-push shock u0 = 1% for
time-consistent policy (respectively Ramsey optimal policy) using Ramsey optimal policy
estimates of Volcker-Greenspan 1979q3-2006q2 period (x = 4:55,  = 0:99,  = 0:340
and  = 0:995) . Figures 7 and 8 plots two out-of-equilibrium impulse responses for an
evil-agent x0  0:1% taking into account a small measurement error of the initial date
output gap. In the case of time-consistent policy for a measurement error of the ini-
tial output gap x0   0:1%, the evil-agent out-of-equilibrium time-consistent policy path
leads to depression in a year coupled to hyperination in two years (gure 7). For a
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measurement error of the initial output gap x0 + 0:1%, the evil-agent out-of-equilibrium
time-consistent policy path leads to boom in four quarters coupled with deation in ve
quarters. On gure 8, evil-agent out-of-equilibrium Ramsey optimal policy ination path
are converging with the optimal path in three years, with near-zero ination in ve years.
Because the policy instrument linearly responds to the near-unit-root cost-push shock,
the convergence towards equilibrium of out-of-equilibrium and equilibrium paths is very
long. These gures shows that for plausible evil-agent measurement errors of the ina-
tion anchor, Ramsey optimal policy is a pre-condition for robust-control optimal policy
(Hansen and Sargent (2008)), unless the behavior of the evil-agent is strictly restricted to
fool the central bank in the smaller stable subspace of time-consistent policy (Giordani
and Söderlind (2004)).
6 Conclusion
This paper proposes new pre-tests and test of Ramsey optimal policy versus time-consistent
policy and (optimal) simple rules. It applied this new estimation methods using the
reference new-Keynesian Phillips curve with an auto-regressive cost-push shock as the
transmission mechanism of monetary policy.
The pre-test rejects time-consistent policy on US data for the period 1960-2006. The
number of identication restrictions required for time-consistent policy is three instead
of one for Ramsey optimal policy. The test of Ramsey optimal policy does not nd
statistical signicance of the slope of the new-Keynesian Phillips curve and hence of the
Feds preference parameter.
This paper suggests further research estimating Ramsey optimal policy and time-
consistent policy using alternative transmission mechanism than the new-Keynesian Phillips
curve with an auto-regressive cost-push shock. Because of the very weak partial correla-
tion between lagged output gap and ination, adding many other equations while keeping
the new-Keynesian Phillips curve with an auto-regressive cost-push shock into the mone-
tary policy transmission mechanism does not appear to be promising to t US data since
the 60s.
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6.1 Appendix 1: Augmented Discounted Linear Quadratic Reg-
ulator
The new-Keynesian Phillips curve can be written as a function of the Lagrange multiplier:
t = Et [t+1] + 

x
t+1 + u;t where  > 0, 0 <  < 1
It can be written:
Et [t+1] +
2
x
t+1 =
1

t   1

u;t where  > 0, 0 <  < 1
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The solution of the Hamiltonian system are based on the demonstrations of the aug-
mented discounted linear quadratic regulator in Anderson, Hansen, McGrattan and Sar-
gent [1996]:
La
0@ t+1t+1
ut+1
1A = Na
0@ tt
ut
1A
where
La =
0@ 1 2x 00 1 0
0 0 1
1A ;Na =
0@ 1 0  1 1 1 0
0 0 
1A
As La is non singular:
(La) 1Na =Ma =
0@ 1 + 2x   2x   1 1 1 0
0 0 
1A =
0@ 1a   1 1 + 1   1a   1 1 1 0
0 0 
1A
where Gali (2015) denotes a = a (; ; x) = xx(1+)+2 =
1
1++ 
2
x
. The characteristic
polynomial of matrixMa:
(X   )

X2   1
a
X +
1


= 0
Matrix Ma has two stable roots with bounded discounted quadratic loss function
(below
q
1

):  and R =
1 
p
1 4a2
2a
(R is denoted  in Gali (2015)) and one unstable
root U =
1+
p
1 4a2
2a
because the determinant of the matrix Ma is RU = 
q
1

q
1

and R <
q
1

imply U =
1+
p
1 4a2
2a
= 1
R
>
q
1

.
R (; ; x) =
1
2
0@1 + 1

+
2
x
 
s
1 +
1

+
2
x
2
  4

1A
@R
@x
> 0, lim
x!0
R = 0 and lim
x!+1
R = 1 <
1p

Identication of 
x
: The ratio 
x
is identied using the following two equalities
dening the ination rule parameter F;R, which are found for the characteristic polyno-
mial equal to zero:
F;R =
1  R

=

R
1  R


x
)
0 = R  

1 +  +
2
x

R + 1
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Positive sign restriction of F;R: The eigenvalue R is a linear decreasing function
of the ination rule parameter F;R. It varies between zero (for the relative cost of
changing the interest rate tending to zero: x ! 0) and the inverse  of the laissez-
faire eigenvalue 1

(for the relative cost of changing the interest rate tending to innity:
x ! +1). This sets boundaries restrictions of the ination rule parameter F;R, which
is strictly positive (see appendix):
F;R =
1

  

R =

R
1  R


x
2

1  2

;
1


: (37)
Ricatti equation solution: P is the slope of eigenvectors of the stable eigenvalue
R of the matrix H of the Hamiltonian system when u0 = 0 = ut

1

+ 
2
x
  2
x
 1 1

=

1 1
P PU

R 0
0 U

1 1
P PU
 1

1

+ 
2
x
  2
x
 1 1

=
 
1 1
1
1 R
1
1  1
R
!
R 0
0 1
R
 
1 1
1
1 R
1
1  1
R
! 1
The stable eigenvalue R is the stable solution of the characteristic polynomial of the
hamiltonian matrix H:
R =
1
2
0@ 1

+
2
x
+ 1 
s
1

+
2
x
+ 1
2
  4

1A
The slope P of eigenvectors of the stable eigenvalue R is given by:
P =
R   a11
a12
=
a21
R   a22 =
1
1  R 2 [1;+1[ where

a11 =
1

+ 
2
x
a12 =   2x 6= 0
a21 =  1 a22 = 1

or
P =
1
2
x
2
0@ 1

+
2
x
  1 +
s
1

+
2
x
+ 1
2
  4

1A or
P =
1
2
0@x
2
+ 1  x
2
+
s
x
2
+ 1  x
2
2
+ 4
x
2
1A
P is also the positive solution of a scalar Ricatti equation (demonstration using
undetermined coe¢ cients in proposition 1):
P   1
P
=
1

+
2
x
  
2
x
P
0 =   
2
x
P 2 +

1

+
2
x
  1

P + 1
0 = P 2  

x
2
+ 1  x
2

P   x
2
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Proposition 1: Rule parameters Fu and Pu of the cost-push shock ut satisfy:
Pu
P
=
 R
1  R =
  1

1
R
   and
Fu
F
=  1 + Pu
P
=
 1
1  R =
1
R
Pu
P
(38)
Pu =
 R
1  R
1
1  R and Fu =
 1
1  R

1

  

R

=
 1
1  R

R
1  R


x
= Pu

x
(39)
and the optimal initial anchor of ination on the cost-push shock is:
0

R
+
; 
 

=
 Pu
P
u0 =
1

1
R
  u0 =
 x

x0 with  < 1 <
1

<
1
R
= U (40)
Demonstration: It uses the method of undetermined coe¢ cients of Anderson, Hansen,
McGrattan and Sargents (1996), section 5, on Galis (2015) Ramsey optimal policy. Us-
ing the innite horizon transversality conditions, the solution is the one that stabilizes
the state-costate vector for any initialization of ination 0 and of the exogenous shock
u0 in a stable subspace of dimension two within a space of dimension three (t; t; ut) of
the Hamiltonian system. We seek a characterization of the Lagrange multiplier t of the
form:
t = Pt + Puut:
To deduce the control law associated with matrix (P; Pu), we substitute it into the
Hamiltonian system:
La
0@ t+1Pt+1 + Puut+1
ut+1
1A = Na
0@ tPt + Puut
ut
1A
If we write the three equations in this system separately,

1 +
2
x
P

t+1 +
2
x
Puut+1 =
1

t   1

ut
Pt+1 + Puut+1 = (P   1)t + Puut
ut+1 = ut
Substitute the last equation into the rst and solve for t+1:
t+1 =

1 +
2
x
P
 1
1

t +

  1

  
2
x
Pu

ut

It is straightforward to verify that:
1
1 + 
2
x
P
= 1 
2
x
P
1 + 
2
x
P
= 1 
2

P
x +
2

P
The policy instrument evolves in the stable subspace of the Hamiltonian. We seek a
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characterization of the policy rule of the form:
xt = Ft + Fuut:
The evolution equation of ination can be rewritten with a feedback rule as:
t+1 =

1

  

F

t +

  1

  

Fu

ut
where F is given by:
F =


P
x +
2

P
=
P
 + 
2
x
P

x
=

R
1  R


x
(41)
where Fu is given by (demonstration (1) below):
Fu
F
=  1 + Pu
P
where Pu
P
is given by (demonstration (2) below):
Pu
P
=
 R
1  R
so that Fu is given by:
Fu
F
=  1  R
1  R =
 1
1  R =
1
R
Pu
P
Demonstration (1) is:
 
1 
2

P
x +
2

P
!
  1

  
2
x
Pu

=   1

  
2
x
Pu 
2
x
P
1 + 
2
x
P

  1

  
2
x
Pu

=   1

+
  2
x
Pu+
2
x
P
1

1 + 
2
x
P
=   1

  


x
Pu  xP
1 + 
2
x
P
)
Fu =
  
x
P +

x
Pu
1 + 
2
x
P
=

x
P
1 + 
2
x
P

 1 + Pu
P

Fu
F
=  1 + Pu
P
:
For demonstration (2), substitute the auto-regressive equation of the forcing variable
ut into the law of motion of the Lagrange multiplier remaining in stable subspace and
solve for Pt+1:
Pt+1 + Puut+1 = (P   1)t + Puut
Pt+1 = (P   1)t + (Pu   Pu)ut
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The coe¢ cient on ut is Pu Pu. To obtain an alternative formula for this coe¢ cient,
premultiply the evolution equation for ination including the feedback rule by 1

P:
1

Pt+1 =
1

P

1

  

F

t +
1

P

  1

  

Fu

ut
Using both formulas of the feedback rule, we rewrite the coe¢ cient on ut. First:

1

  

F

P
 1

+ Pu

=
1

P
 1

+
1

Pu  


x
P
1 + 
2
x
P

P
 1

+ Pu

=
1

P
 
 1

  


x
( P + Pu)
1 + 
2
x
P
!
+
1

Pu
Hence:
1

P

  1

  

Fu

=

1  F


P
 1

+ Pu

  1

Pu
That is:
  1

  

Fu = R

P

P
 1

+ Pu

  
P
Pu


That is:
  1

  

Fu = R

 1 + Pu
P

  Pu
P
 = R
Fu;R
F;R
  RFu;R
F;R

  1

  

Fu = (1  )RFu;R
F;R
Equating coe¢ cients on ut in the two equations results in a scalar Sylvester equation:
Pu   Pu =

1  F


( P + Pu)  Pu
Pu = R ( P + Pu)
Pu =
 RP
1  R =)
Pu
P
=
 R
1  R
Hence:
Fu;R
F;R
=  1 + Pu
P
=  1 + 
  R
1  R

=
 1
1  R
Q.E.D.
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6.2 Appendix 2: A representation of the optimal policy rule
function of the non-observable AR(1) cost-push shock.
Gali (2015) stationary equilibrium process for the output gap and the cost-push shock,
using basis vectors (ut; xt):
ut = ut 1 + "u;t (42)
xt = Rxt 1   R
1  R

x
ut (43)
corresponds to a change of basis vectors (ut; xt) of the ADLQR representation:
ut
xt

= N 1

ut
t

with N 1 =

1 0
Fu;R F;R

implying Gali (2015) observationally and mathematically equivalent third representa-
tion of the VAR(1) of Ramsey optimal policy:
8>><>>:

ut+1
t+1

= (A+BFC)

ut
t

+

1
0

"t
xt = F;Rt + Fu;Rut
0 =  x x0 and u0 given
,
8>><>>:

ut+1
xt+1

= N 1 (A+BF)N

ut
xt

+N 1

1
0

"t
t =
1
F;R
xt   Fu;RF;Rt
0 =  x x0 and u0 given
with Gali (2015) representation of the Ramsey optimal policy rule as the second line
of the VAR(1). The output gap rule depends on its lagged value and on the lagged value
of the cost-push shock ut:
N 1 (A+BF)N=

 0
  R
1 R

x
 R

for t = 1; 2; 3::: where the two stable eigenvalues of the stable subspace  and R are
invariant to changes of basis vectors. This is obtained with intermediate computations:

1 0
AF;R F;R

 0
(1  )AR R

1 0
AF;R F;R
 1
=

 0
(1  R)AF;R R

where:
(1  R)AF;R = (1  R)  1
1  R

R
1  R


x
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6.3 Appendix 3: Identication issue for reduced form including
a non-observable AR(1) shock.
Because the auto-correlation of the policy instrument xt and the auto-correlation of the
cost-push shock are competing to explain the persistence of the policy instrument xt, this
partial adjustment model with serially correlated shocks has a problem of identication
and multiple equilibria (Griliches (1967), Blinder (1986), McManus et al. (1994), Fève,
Matheron Poilly (2007)). This VAR(1) can be written as:
xt = Rxt 1 + t and t = t 1 + ";t
where t =   x R(1 R)ut. It is an AR(2) model of the policy instrument rule:
xt = Rxt 1 +  (xt 1   Rxt 2) + ";t
xt = b1xt 1 + b2xt 2 + ";t with b1 = R +  and b2 =  R:
The structural parameter  and the semi-structural parameter R are functions of
reduced form parameters b1 and b2 solutions of:
X2   b1X   b2 = 0
which are given by:
R =
b1 
p
b21 + 4b2
2
and  = b  R
where  = b21 + 4b2 = (  R)2. If  6= 0 and  6= R, two sets of values for R and
 are observationally equivalent. The rst solution is such that R >  and the second
solution is such that R < . The larger , the larger the identication issue, because
it increases the gap between a more inertial monetary policy with lower correlation of
monetary policy shocks and a less inertial monetary policy, that we cannot distinguish.
The ADLQR representation and Gali (2015) representation of the stationary solution of
the VAR(1) of optimal policy are not useful to identify parameters, because they include
the cost-push shock ut which is not observable.
The reduced form estimated variance  provides another equation with a theoret-
ical positive sign restriction 
x
R
(1 R) > 0 for ve unknowns structural parameters
(x; ; ; ; u):

x
R
(1  R)u = 
6.4 Appendix 4: Oudiz and Sachs (2015) Time Consistent Dis-
cretionary policy
Substituting the private sectors ination rule (8) and policy rule (9) in the ination law
of motion (1) and comparing it with the forcing variable law of motion (2) leads to the
following relation between NTC on date t, NTC;t+1 and Fu;TC :
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t = Et [t+1] + xt + ut )
NTCut = NTC;t+1ut + Fu;TCut + ut
NTC = NTC;t+1 + Fu;TC + 1
A myopic central bank does not notice that NTC;t+1 = NTC (Gali (2015)) in its
optimization:
NTC;Gali = NTC;t+1 + Fu;TC + 1 ) @NTC;Gali
@Fu;TC
= 
F;TC =
Fu;TC
NTC
=   
x
< 0
This rst order condition of the central bank optimization is substituted into the new-
Keynesian Phillips curve equation, where, only at this stage, players of the game discover
that it is assumed NTC;t+1 = NTC;t = NTC . Galis (2015) solutions are:
Fu;TC;Gali =   
2 + x (1  ) =  

x
NTC
NTC;Gali =
x
2 + x (1  )
In time-consistent equilibrium (Oudiz and Sachs (1985)), the central bank does fore-
sees thatNTC;t+1 = NTC in its optimization, with the following solutions, that we consider
for the remaining part of the paper:
NTC =
Fu;TC + 1
1   =
F;TCNTC + 1
1   )
@Nu;TC
@Fu;TC
=

1  
F;TC =
Fu;TC
NTC
=   
x
1
1   =  

x
N < 0
Fu;TC =   
2 + x (1  )2
NTC =
x (1  )
2 + x (1  )2
In Oudiz and Sachs(1985) general solution, this is the condition after substitutions
of the private sectors rule (matrix NTC) and the policy makers rule (matrix Fu;TC) for
both dates t and t+ 1 into the law of motion of the private sector dynamics:
NTC;t = J  KFu;TC
J = (A22 +NTC;t+1A12)
 1 (NTC;t+1A11 + A21)
K = (A22 +NTC;t+1A12)
 1 (NTC;t+1B1 +B2)
with general notations and equalities with Galis (2015) transmission mechanism:
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
ut+1
t+1

=

A11 =  A12 = 0
A21 =   1 A22 = 1

ut
t

+

B1 = 0
B2 =  

xt
In Oudiz and Sachs (1985), NTC;t+1 = NTC;t at all dates, whereas Gali (2015) assumes
myopia (or NTC;t+1 = 0) for the policy maker. This assumption changes the initial jump
of ination, impulse response functions of ination and the output gap and welfare. It
does not change the identication problem of discretion raised in this paper, because the
stable subspace of discretion have the same dimension (one) using the reference Oudiz
and Sachs (1985) discretion equilibrium or Gali (2015) and Clarida, Gali, Gertler (1999)
myopia assumption.
6.5 Appendix 5: Denition of data variables
Mavroeidis data are running from 1960-Q1 to 2006-Q2.
Ination is annualized quarter-on-quarter rate of ination, 400 * LN( GDPDEF/
GDPDEF(-1)) with GDPDEF: Gross Domestic Product Implicit Price Deator, 2000=100,
Seasonally Adjusted. Released in August 2006. Source: U.S. Department of Commerce,
Bureau of Economic Analysis.
GAPCBO is the output gap measure: 100 * LN(GDPC1/GDPPOT) with GDPC1:
Real Gross Domestic Product, Billions of Chained 2000 Dollars, Seasonally Adjusted
Annual Rate, Released in August 2006. Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau
of Economic Analysis and GDPPOT: Real Potential Gross Domestic Product, Billions of
Chained 2000 Dollars. Source: U.S. Congress, Congressional Budget O¢ ce.
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Figure 3: Time series of inflation and output gap and Volcker’s 1979q3 and 1982q1 
 
Figure 4: Time-consistent null hypothesis: perfect negative correlation (all dots should be on the regression line) is 
rejected (R2=16% < 100%). 
 
Figure 5: Time-consistent null hypothesis: zero serial correlation of residuals (horizontal regression line) is rejected 
(ρ=0.89). 
 
Figure 6 and 7: Time-consistent null hypothesis: identical slopes (auto-correlation) of inflation (ρ=0.59, R2=41%) and of 
output gap (ρ=0.95, R2=92%) is rejected. 
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Robustness to misspecification. 
Impulse responses of expected (positive) inflation πt and expected (negative) output gap xt during two years for time-
consistent and during six years for Ramsey optimal policy after a +1% extremely persistent autoregressive (ρ=0.995) 
shock ut (horizontal axis) using Volcker-Greenspan (1979q3-2006q2) Ramsey estimates, with the cost of changing the 
policy instrument αx=4.55, β=0.99, κ=0.34. Figures also represent evil-agent out-of-equilibrium the impulse responses 
for initial output gap anchors with small likely measurement errors: x0+/-0.1%. 
Figure 8. Time-consistent policy: inflation Fπ,D=-5, shock: Fu=0. Initial inflation π0=0.6% Initial output gap x0=-2.9% +/-
0.1% measurement error. 
 
Figure 9. Ramsey optimal policy. Rule: inflation Fπ=0.45, shock: Fu=-2.86. Initial inflation π0=5.5%. Initial output gap x0=-
0.4%+/-0.1% 
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